Judge Judith Hayes passionately wants my blog to disappear

Photo: Judge Judith Hayes

Judge Judith Hayes:

“SO I'M NOT GIVING YOU PERMISSION TO PUT ANYTHING ON [YOUR BLOG].”

Below is my petition for writ, filed yesterday in the California Court of Appeal regarding this case. The most amazing passages are quotes from my San Diego Superior Court judge, Judith F. Hayes. She really, really worries about the families of the lawyers at Stutz Artiano Shinoff & Holtz. At the same time she clearly believes that it's wrong to mention the families harmed by these lawyers. What's her reasoning? She won't say, but her purpose is clearly to silence all criticism of public entity lawyers.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF REVIEW AND/OR PROHIBITION OR OTHER EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF

I. INTRODUCTION

This Petition regards a May 30, 2012 minute order adding $5000 contempt sanctions to a March 10, 2010 OSC Contempt order, for which Appellant had already paid $3000 sanctions.

The original $3000 sanctions were based on the December 11, 2009 Permanent Injunction, which was ruled unconstitutional by the Court of Appeal on Aug. 5, 2011 and the April 6, 2009 Permanent Injunction, which is exceedingly vague and has been interpreted in an unconstitutional manner by the trial court.

A. STATEMENT OF URGENCY

Petitioner asks for a stay of all sanctions while this petition is being heard by the Court of Appeal in order to prevent further violation of Defendant’s Constitutional Rights. On August 5, 2011 the Court of Appeal (Exhibit 60) (I PA 1021-1042) overturned the “exceedingly broad” December 11, 2009 permanent injunction (Exhibit 48b) (I PA pages 2a-b) by the trial judge in this case.

Despite that Court of Appeal ruling, the trial court has continued to try to restrict Defendant’s speech in an unconstitutional manner. The trial court’s goal is exactly the same as it was before the Aug. 5, 2011 ruling: to prevent Defendant from mentioning Plaintiff’s name by any means or media, but the court is now relying on the April 6, 2009 injunction (Exhibit 48a) (I PA pages 1a-b), rather than the December 11, 2009 injunction, to achieve this goal.

The trial judge’s actions in this case, summed up in her statement, “SO I'M NOT GIVING YOU PERMISSION TO PUT ANYTHING ON” (Exhibit 90) (III PA 1511 line 19), are clearly unconstitutional.

The trial court stated on June 21, 2012 (Exhibit 90) (III PA 1509 lines 4-19):

THE COURT

… THE ONLY WAY TO COMPEL YOUR -- YOUR FOLLOWING OF THE COURT'S ORDER IS TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS.

SANCTIONS ARE BEING IMPOSED IN A WAY THAT GOES STEP BY STEP. EACH SANCTION IS MORE SEVERE THAN THE PREVIOUS SANCTION UNTIL YOU DECIDE TO COMPLY WITH THE COURT ORDER AND THE INJUNCTION THAT YOU AGREED TO.

AND I DON'T KNOW WHY YOU INSIST ON DOING THIS. BUT AS LONG AS YOU DO, THEN THE COURT WILL HAVE NO OPTION BUT TO GO FORWARD WITH THESE SANCTIONS UNTIL YOU DECIDE NOT TO DAMAGE THAT LAW FIRM ANYMORE. AND THAT'S -- THAT'S WHERE WE ARE.

THERE'S NO REASON TO STAY AN ENFORCEMENT OF THE SANCTIONS, AND SO THE MOTION IS DENIED.

At the same hearing the court stated that it would not say whether the statements “Daniel Shinoff trains school attorneys” and “Daniel Shinoff plans legal tactics against parents” are violations of thd injunction. Yet these statements angered the judge so much on October 30, 2009 (see Plaintiff’s first Motion to Strike Defendant’s Answer in Appendix for case D057190--Exhibits 38-46 III AA 480-796 case D057190), that she issued an order that Defendant could never, by any means or method, mention Plaintiff’s name (Exhibit 48b) (I PA pages 2a-b).

The following is from the court reporter’s transcript of the June 21, 2012 ex parte hearing requesting a stay of sanctions (Exhibit 90) (III PA 1504-1512).

MS. LARKINS:

SO YOU ARE SAYING THAT TRAINING--DANIEL SHINOFF TRAINS SCHOOL ATTORNEYS IS A VIOLATION OF THE INJUNCTION?

THE COURT:

WHAT I'M SAYING IS THAT I WILL NOT GO WITH YOU WORD BY WORD THROUGH WHAT YOU WANT TO DO, BECAUSE I BELIEVE IT IS PART OF YOUR PLAN TO CIRCUMVENT THE COURT ORDER.

YOU DON'T REALLY WANT TO KNOW FROM THE COURT WHAT THE COURT IS SAYING ABOUT A WORD OR TWO WORDS BECAUSE YOU INTEND TO GO FORWARD, AS I SEE IT, AND PUT THE SAME DEFAMATORY MATERIAL ON THAT WEBSITE THAT YOU'VE MAINTAINED ALL ALONG. AND THAT'S NOT GOING TO HAPPEN.

SO I'M NOT GOING TO ANSWER YOUR SPECIFIC QUESTION ABOUT A WORD.

"TRAINED ATTORNEYS," OF COURSE IS NOT DEFAMATORY ON ITS FACE, AND IT'S NOT DEFAMATORY WHEN STANDING ALONE, BUT IN CONTEXT -- AND THE CONTEXT IN WHICH YOU EMPLOY IT, IT MAY WELL BE.

SO I'M NOT GIVING YOU PERMISSION TO PUT ANYTHING ON.

(Exhibit 90) (III PA 1511 lines 2-19)

The trial judge said that the statement Daniel Shinoff trains school attorneys “may well be” defamatory. Apparently the judge is not sure, but she’s not giving Defendant permission to put anything (anything!) on her website. How can the judge not be sure? The statement “Daniel Shinoff trains school attorneys” has been discussed in this case for about three years.

If the judge doesn’t know whether it’s a violation of the April 6, 2009 injunction, how can Petitioner know?

Contrary to what the judge says, Petitioner does want to know, and has a right to know, what she is allowed to say. How could she possibly guess that “Daniel Shinoff trains school attorneys” could be a violation of the injunction?

The judge explained further on June 21, 2012:

THE COURT:

WE'RE GOING TO LOOK AT THIS IN TOTO AND SEE WHAT THE WEBSITE SAYS, WHETHER OR NOT IT'S DEFAMATORY TO THE LAW FIRM. AND IF IT IS, OR IF IT VIOLATES THE TERMS OF THE INJUNCTION THAT YOU AGREED TO, THEN I'LL DO WHAT HAS TO BE DONE TO ENFORCE THE INJUNCTION.

(Exhibit 90) (III PA 1511 lines 20-25)

The April 6, 2009 injunction and its enforcement have deprived Defendant, and will deprive Defendant more severely in the future, of property without due process of law; the threat of jail has been used

The trial court clearly plans sanctions in the future to force Defendant to erase every mention of Plaintiff on her website. [Stutz Artiano Shinoff & Holtz] has requested that [Maura Larkins] be sanctioned with severe financial penalties and five days in jail. The threat of jail would appear to be the reason that the court mentioned the case In re Liu in its OSC Contempt rulings...

In re Liu is a case in which a Defendant spent eleven days in jail pursuant to CCP 1218 before the Court of Appeal ordered him released, and ordered sanctions returned to him. Why would the court consider this case pertinent to Stutz v. Larkins? In re Liu would seem to be more supportive of [Maura Larkins'] position, since the Defendant was being jailed...[for non-compliance]with an order that he was unable to comply with. Since his children were in Formosa (Taiwan!), the Defendant in his jail cell had no power to return them to California.

Likewise, the Defendant in the instant case is unable to comply with an injunction when the judge refuses to clarify it. It has done Defendant no good in this case when she erased statement after statement, because no statement can pass muster. Defendant has finally given up trying to please Plaintiff and the court, and has followed her own conscience regarding fulfilling her agreement of April 6, 2009.

At the June 21, 2012 ex parte hearing there were two bailiffs standing next to Defendant’s table during most of her hearing.

INSTEAD OF RIGHTING A WRONG AFTER THE AUG. 5, 2011 COURT OF APPEAL DECISION, THE TRIAL COURT HAS INCREASED THE AMOUNT OF SANCTIONS BASED ON THE MARCH 10, 2010 OSC MOTION

For the trial court to add to the sanctions based on the March 10, 2010 OSC after the Court of Appeal has ruled the underlying injunction unconstitution is inexplicable.

As the injunction has been interpreted by Plaintiff and Judge Hayes, its purpose is NOT to ban certain words which would be defamatory if untrue (as Defendant was led to believe), but rather to ban Defendant from reporting public entity law firm Plaintiff’s actions. Defendant is banned by the court’s interpretation of the injunction from reporting any actions of Plaintiff, even actions self-reported by Plaintiff to the media, if plaintiff and the court claim that those actions are unethical or illegal (!!!!!!).

THE PURPOSE OF THE $5000 SANCTION

The court stated clearly during the OSC hearing on March 5, 2010 that the purpose of the $3000 sanction was to force defendant to remove all mention of Plaintiff from her website before the Court of Appeal could rule on the matter. It appears that this is also the purpose of the additional $5000 sanction based on that same OSC, except that now the trial court is circumventing a ruling of the Court of Appeal rather than preempting it.

B. WHY STAY AND WRIT RELIEF SHOULD BE GRANTED

Defendant is not able to comply with the court’s vague orders

Instead of allowing a jury trial for damages to which defendant is entitled in this case, Judge Judith Hayes has for over three years designed a series of ever-expanding permanent injunctions, each one more unconstitutional than the last. The judge’s stated purpose was to prevent defendant from having to pay damages. The actual purpose seems to be to shut down defendant’s website in violation of the First Amendment. The judge made it clear from the beginning that all she wanted was to shut down Defendant’s website, and she never wanted to impoverish Defendant. The judge seems sincerely reluctant to impoverish Defendant, but feels she must do so in order to achieve her over-arching purpose of silencing Defendant’s speech about public entity lawyers.

C. HARM TO PETITIONER AND THE PUBLIC

THE APRIL 6, 2009 INJUNCTION, AS INTERPRETED BY PLAINTIFF AND THE COURT, IS CAUSING AND WILL CAUSE IRREPARABLE HARM TO DEFENDANT AND THE PUBLIC

The goal of the sanctions is to force Defendant to erase every mention of Plaintiff on her websites, and never mention Plaintiff’s name again, by any means or method. The trial court has even refused to give permission to Defendant to call the police or other authorities to report a crime committed by Plaintiff, to complain to the Bar Association, or to seek legal counsel in this case. All these actions are banned by the injunction.

I do not have enough income to pay the sanctions ordered by the court, or to pay interest and principal on an additional credit card debt of that amount. Being forced to go into debt to pay the $5000, or being punished for not paying, would cause me irreparable harm. The previous $3000.00 in sanctions based on the same OSC is still owed by me to my credit union.

An extraordinary writ is necessary to prevent irreparable harm to petitioner and the public. A temporary stay followed by a determination of the constitutionality of the permanent injunction is urgently needed in this case.

Damage will occur to petitioner and the public without an immediate stay of all sanctions and a determination of the constitutionality of the three permanent injunctions. Petitioner is harmed by her loss of freedom of speech. Also, the time lost by petitioner during months of work erasing all mention of Plaintiff from her websites could never be regained and serves no purpose other than to harm petitioner and the public. The inability to mention Plaintiff or any of its attorneys would be extremely damaging to petitioner’s website, which focuses on public entities and their lawyers. The public’s loss of its access to information during this time would be a suspension of its constitutional rights and would be harmful to all who need this information at this time. Even a temporary disappearance of information about Plaintiff can cause the web address to fall in the ratings on Internet search engines, making it unavailable to those seeking information about Plaintiff. Finally, threatened financial damage and loss of freedom would be harmful to petitioner...





UPDATE: ON JUNE 29, 2012 THE COURT OF APPEAL DENIED MY PETITION TO STAY SANCTIONS. IN AN EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF SANCTIONS BEYOND MY ABILITY TO AFFORD, I SENT THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO STUTZ LAW FIRM ON JULY 2, 2012:

Dear Mr. Holtz, Mr. Shinoff, Mr. Artiano and other Stutz lawyers involved in this case:

I am pleased that you have expressed an interest in being ethical in your actions. I would like to bring to your attention that your Motion regarding the court's OSC re Contempt that was decided on March 10, 2012 did not mention any statement of mine that was a violation of the April 6, 2009 injunction. Both you and the court were relying on the December 11, 2009 injunction to justify a finding of contempt against me. Since the December 11, 2009 injunction was found to be unconstitutional on Aug. 5, 2011 by the Court of Appeal, the $3000 in sanctions ordered against me was also unconstitutional. I ask you, in the name of basic honesty as well as legal ethics, to return the $3000 to me.

I am not able to afford all the sanctions against me, particularly the recent $5000 sanction.

But if you return the $3000 to me, then I can pay you $3000 of the new sanction. This could be done on paper, with no actual cash transfer.

The new sanction is strange since it is based on the April 6, 2009 injunction, yet the judge has refused to clarify her interpretation of that injunction, and has not permitted me to respond to allegations.

Also, the judge has not stated whether she believes it is a violation of the injunction to publish public records, and she hasn't stated whether she believes that visitors to my blog are also restrained by the April 6, 2009 injunction.

Judge Hayes says she can not even decide whether I have violated the injunction by stating, "Daniel Shinoff trains education attorneys." Yet this was one of the statements that caused her to become so angry that she banned me from mentioning your names at all, even to call the police or other authorities, or to seek legal counsel.

Clearly, this case is in a state of confusion. I would hope that you would not try to profit by taking advantage of the court's confusion. I expect the outcome of this case to be determined by law, as I trust you do. You would not want to silence me by bankrupting me, would you? If I had lots of money, I'd be happy to hand over as much as Judith Hayes desired, but I am struggling financially. I could sell a vehicle to come up with cash. But I would like to request that I be allowed to pay off the remaining $2000 sanction at a monthly rate, with 10% interest.

Would that be amendable to you?

Sincerely,
Maura Larkins

Judge Hayes has sanctioned me for mentioning the Vista Unified v. Dr. B. J. Freeman case on my website

Judge Judith Hayes, San Diego Superior Court

See all posts re Dr. B.J. Freeman.
See all posts re Stutz v. Larkins.

Is a judge allowed to order a citizen to agree with the actions of public entities and their lawyers? Am I allowed to say that I think a lawyer made a mistake, or that I disagree that a public entity should behave a certain way? Of course I am, but Judge Judith Hayes is trying to convince me otherwise. She tells me I don't understand constitutional law. Judge Hayes' May 30, 2012 decision in Stutz Artiano Shinoff & Holtz v. Larkins states (page 2, paragraph 6), “…[Stutz] sought to remove a statement made by defendant that plaintiff paid witnesses to testify as plaintiff’s clients desired.”

This is a false statement by the court. Not only did I never make such a statement, but Plaintiff never even accused me of making such a statement.

The words have been changed by the judge to create a different meaning. Paying a witness to testify a certain way is different from suing an expert whom one has paid to do an evaluation.

The case at issue is the lawsuit against Dr. B. J. Freeman by Vista Unified School District for failing to testify as the district wished in a special education hearing. Dr. B. J. Freeman was sued for violating her contract. She objected that she wasn’t paid to testify a certain way; she was paid to evaluate students. At first Stutz argued that she was also obliged to testify as the school wished, but then Stutz realized that this was not true, and the lawsuit against Dr. Freeman was dropped. Stutz implicitly admitted that she hadn't been paid to testify a certain way.

Dr. Freeman's contract did NOT include a requirement that she testify as the district wished, at least not if she believed such testimony to be false, and I never said that it did.

But Judge Hayes' May 30, 2012 decision becomes more blatantly inaccurate in paragraph 7 of page 2: “Defendant continues the same here, stating that plaintiff has pressured witnesses to perjure themselves (See Plaintiff’s Ex. C, p. 5)

In fact, Plaintiff’s Exhibit C, p. 5 says, “Attorneys who have helped schools avoid revealing events in schools are in charge of training both new board members and school attorneys. Dan Shinoff trains board members and employees as well as attorneys.”

Keeping events secret and pressuring witnesses to perjure themselves are completely different things. The court’s reference to Ex. C, p. 5 was made without regard to the truth.

Judge Hayes' recent decision denies my constitutional right to due process and fair and equal treatment under the law.

Judge Hayes should have ordered Stutz law firm to return the $3000 March 10, 2010 sanction that was based on an injunction that was ruled unconstitutional by the Court of Appeal.

See California Court of Appeal Aug. 5, 2011 decision in Maura Larkins' favor). Instead, the judge now gives a new $5000 sanction based on that very same March 10, 2010 decision. And what is the purpose of the $8000 in sanctions? It seems to be to impoverish me so that I will not be able to proceed in court to obtain a minimal standard of justice.

Also, Judge Hayes claims that I currently have third-party comments on my site that have been removed. I produced print-outs that showed the comments had been removed; still, the court claims these comments are currently on my site and uses the comments to justify sanctions. Also, the sanctions are justified by my having certain public records on my site.

Here are more details from the Freeman case:

I am not expressing any opinion about the ethics or legality of the actions of Vista Unified's lawyers in this case. I'm just reporting what the case was about.

Dr. B. J. Freeman's defense against VUSD's breach of contract lawsuit was that there was nothing in her contract that required her to make statements under oath that she believed to be untrue.

Attorney's Daniel Shinoff and Gil Abed's described Dr. Freeman's position in their Opposition to Demurrer, p. 4, lines 21-28:

"...Defendant [Dr. B.J. Freeman] urges the court to make the District plead ‘specific language which purportedly bound Dr. Freeman to offer testimony that she believed was not accurate, i.e., that she had contracted to give testimony in support of a plan developed by plaintiff which was inconsistent with her recommendations and which was changed without her input.'

"...This curious passage is pregnant with Defendant’s factual opposition to the Complaint—that the plan was changed without her knowledge or input, and that the District asked her to perjury herself. The Court simply must ignore these allegations which belong in an Answer."

Page 5, lines 6-11:

“The DISTRICT has alleged that ‘one week before a hearing was to begin, after the DISTRICT had expended substantial resources and payments preparing for the Due Process Hearing, FREEMAN, without justification, cause, or reason, indicated that she would not…testify on behalf of the DISTRICT…

"This was, at the very least, an anticipatory breach. The DISTRICT’s settlement with the student may be relevant as to damages, however, that is a factual issue not properly raised on Demurrer.”

Apparently the district considered, but did not follow, the doctor’s recommendation for placement, but the District nevertheless felt that the doctor would still be required to testify under oath that the District’s decision was in line with her evaluation of the child.

Page 5 lines 22-26

"Defendant promised to…support the DISTRICT if students contested the DISTRICT’S placement where the placement was based on [emphasis added] Defendant’s assessment of the program and recommendation for placement…"



Here's another judge who likes to keep public records secret, and to flagrantly favor one side over the other in litigation.

The courts: Judge tried to keep evidence secretBy David Heath Seattle Times June 14, 2012 Judge Sharon Armstrong ordered InfoSpace records sealed when a shareholder, arguing that executives had deceived investors, sued the company. Then she sealed her order that put the case on hold.

For more than two years, reams of documents showing that InfoSpace executives deceived stockholders were sealed in a shareholder lawsuit at the King County courthouse.

The records contained evidence that some InfoSpace executives used accounting tricks to create the illusion of success — information that the company's faithful investors would certainly want to know.

But King County Superior Court Judge Sharon Armstrong allowed InfoSpace lawyers to stamp as confidential hundreds of documents in the case.

If the documents got out, they might fall into the hands of stockholders who were suing InfoSpace executives for deception and self-enrichment in a class-action lawsuit being heard a few blocks away in federal court, she reasoned.

"I've never heard of a judge doing that," said Steve Berman, a lawyer in the federal lawsuit who has read Armstrong's ruling. "It seems to me a very strange logic. Her role is not to be taking the side of the company."

Armstrong also said she was concerned that if the shareholder lawsuit went forward, InfoSpace might have to admit to financial misdeeds by insiders that could cause the company to report a $1 billion loss, which "would destroy the company."

"She was acting on behalf of the company and not on behalf of the public," said Judith Endejan, an attorney who argued the case for The Seattle Times.

Armstrong recently told The Seattle Times by e-mail: "The decisions made in the InfoSpace case, like decisions made in all cases, were based on the law and the factual record presented to the court."

InfoSpace, once the region's biggest dot-com, provides Internet services such as search engines. At the height of the Internet stock mania, the company was worth $31 billion.

In early 2003, The Seattle Times asked Armstrong to unseal InfoSpace records filed in the shareholder lawsuit, citing the state's constitution and past court cases. After she refused, The Times appealed her decision to the Washington Supreme Court.

In a 9-0 decision last year, the justices reversed Armstrong's decisions that allowed wholesale sealing of the court records.

"Proceedings cloaked in secrecy foster mistrust and, potentially, misuse of power," Justice Tom Chambers wrote in the opinion. In the landmark decision, the justices ruled that court records in civil lawsuits are open unless there are compelling reasons for closing them.

Armstrong had ruled that many of the records were protected by attorney-client privilege and should be sealed. But the Washington Supreme Court said the privilege was lost once such documents were filed in court and used by her to make a decision.

[Maura Larkins comment: Who was Judge Armstrong protecting? Naveen Jain! His company Intelius was taking $19 a month out of my checking account as part of a widespread fraud. I believe a class action suit is pending on the Intelius fraud.]

The King County case, known as Dreiling v. Jain, was brought by shareholder Thomas Dreiling, a Seattle lawyer. His lawyers sued InfoSpace founder Naveen Jain and others, accusing them of deceiving shareholders and illegally selling stock based on insider information.

The suit was a "shareholder derivative action." In such cases, a shareholder can ask the company to pursue alleged misconduct against the wrongdoers, with any money recovered going to the company. Usually, the company creates a special committee that investigates the claims and decides whether to pursue the action. InfoSpace's committee investigated and sent a report to Judge Armstrong, asking her to dismiss the case. Instead, she put it on hold and sealed her order.

"There are very narrow circumstances under which a judge can seal her own orders," such as matters of national security or protecting trade secrets, said Floyd Abrams, a First amendment lawyer in New York.

[Maura Larkins comment: Not surprisingly, the company's lawyer has lovely things to say about Judge Armstrong. See next.]

But Steve Sirianni, plaintiff's lawyer in the case, defended Armstrong. "I know of no lawyer appearing before Judge Armstrong in this case who has anything but the utmost respect for her rulings, fairness and impartiality," he said last week in an email to the judge, who had her bailiff send it to The Times.

The federal class-action suit was settled last year for $34.3 million.

In December, Jain and more than a dozen key InfoSpace officials settled the Dreiling lawsuit, with Jain agreeing to pay $3 million. Others are paying $3.4 million. InfoSpace's insurance, covering executive misdeeds, is paying up to $43 million to settle outstanding lawsuits.

As part of the settlement, Dreiling, Jain and the former InfoSpace executives signed confidentiality agreements and will not comment.

Discovery suddenly stayed in Stutz Artiano Shinoff & Holtz v. Maura Larkins

See all posts re Stutz Artiano Shinoff & Holtz v. Maura Larkins

I got a minute order from the San Diego Superior Court in the mail today. The timing is very, very strange. The last hearing in the case was March 9, 2012--two months and three weeks ago. My discussion with Commander Darin Fotheringham in the Santa Barbara Sheriff's office two days ago is the only event that I can connect even remotely to this bolt out of the blue.




June 1, 2012

Commander Darin Fotheringham
Office of the Sheriff of Santa Barbara

Dear Commander Fotheringham:

I was amused that on the very day I contacted you about my subpoena for business records from the Sheriff of Santa Barbara showing that Deputy Michael Carlson and his sister Robin Donlan involved Chula Vista Elementary School District in criminal actions, Judge Judith Hayes suspended all discovery in the case at issue.

My, my. The timing is fascinating. No papers had been filed asking that discovery be stayed. In fact, no papers had been filed in this case for two months.

I bow to your amazing—what shall I call it?—luck, perhaps?

Sincerely,

Maura Larkins



Note: I tried to fax the above letter to the fax number Commander Fotheringham gave me on May 30, 2012 for faxing the subpoena to him. My fax machine dialed the number, then the call was picked up. Next I heard a raspberry sound, and soon a man was telling me that if I'd like to make a call, I should hang up and dial again. I guess the guys who work for the Sheriff of Santa Barbara like to have fun. They seem to be really funny guys.

I think that it is highly unlikely that Commander Fotheringham or Sheriff Bill Brown contacted Judge Hayes. Here's the scenario I came up with for what most likely happened:

Commander Fotheringham may have talked to Michael Carlson. Michael Carlson went into cover-up mode (again). Carlson seems to have no remorse at all, not even for causing problems for the Sheriff of Santa Barbara. My guess is he thinks of himself as a victim. He has never indicated any regret for all the problems his actions caused to me, to my school district (including $100,000s in legal fees to defend Carlson's sister and others), and to the children in my school.

I imagine Michael Carlson would have called his attorney, Deborah Garvin, after Commander Fotheringham spoke to him. And perhaps his sister, Robin Donlan, who turned his misdemeanor into a huge mess for Chula Vista Elementary School District.

Deborah Garvin and Robin Donlan would probably each have contacted Dan Shinoff of Stutz Artiano Shinoff & Holtz, with whom they worked in the earlier case involving Carlson.

And that's where the chain of likely events gets murky for me. What happened next???? I'm simply unable to conjure an explanation for what could have happened.

The minute order I received from Judge Hayes says that discovery is stayed.

But actually it's a lot more complicated. Hayes also finally made a decision about two of the three March 9, 2012 motions. After almost three months of silence, she finally denied my motion to set aside the summary adjudication, even though I was able to provide documentary evidence proving that the decision was deeply flawed.

For the past two months and three weeks she pretended that discovery was open--even gave us a discovery cut-off date--but obviously it was never really open, since the summary adjudication was never set aside. I suspected that I would be shut down the minute I started discovery, so I gave myself a long vacation (including a month in Washington DC) and waited as long as possible to start discovery.

Judge Hayes is still delaying (until August 27, 2012) her decision on Stutz' motion to strike my answer. There is absolutely no case law to support such a decision in a case with a history like this one.

Stutz Artiano Shinoff & Holtz partner James F. Holtz selected Super Lawyer; Holtz is now the firm's lead attorney in defamation case against this blogger

James Holtz has become the lead lawyer in Stutz Artiano Shinoff & Holtz' defamation lawsuit against this blogger. However, Mr. Holtz let his partner Jack Sleeth handle the firm's losing attempt to convince the California Court of Appeal that this blogger should be enjoined from mentioning--either in print or orally--the name of Mr. Holtz or any other lawyer in the firm.

Partner James F. Holtz Selected Super Lawyer & Top Rated Lawyer
MARKETWIRE via COMTEX
May 29, 2012

The law firm of Stutz Artiano Shinoff & Holtz APC is proud to announce that founding partner James F. Holtz has been honored with selection to both the 2012 San Diego Super Lawyers, published by Thomson Reuters, as well as the 2012 Top Rated Lawyers published by The American Lawyer Magazine. Both selections are for "Business Litigation."

Mr. Holtz has been selected to Super Lawyers every year since 2008 when Super Lawyers first expanded their rating service nationwide. Super Lawyers lists outstanding lawyers from more than 70 practice areas who have attained a high degree of peer recognition and professional achievement. The magazine names exceptional attorneys annually in all 50 states and Washington, D.C. The San Diego Super Lawyers list will be published in June and will also be featured in the New York Times, San Diego edition.

Top Rated Lawyers is published by The American Lawyer and developed in partnership with Martindale Hubbell. It is based on Martindale's AV Preeminent ratings, the highest possible review rating in "Legal Ability and Ethical Standards." Mr. Holtz has been AV Preeminent rated for the last 16 years (1996-2012).

Mr. Holtz represents clients in both California and Nevada and has focused on trial and appellate work in complex business and corporate litigation since the firm began in 1982. He is a frequent lecturer before legal and insurance organizations, as well as an Adjunct Professor at California Western School of Law.